There has been an extensive research literature on auctions but recent developments in technology have resulted in new interest in auction mechanisms as a practical way to do resource allocation. This paper presents a new double auction mechanism for allocating resources to create knowledge within an organization, such a s i n vestment in corporate R&D.
Introduction
There has been an extensive research literature on auctions but recent d e v elopments in technology have led to new interest in auction mechanisms as a practical way to do resource allocation. In the Internet world the well-known types of auction mechanisms, primarily English auctions, have become the basis for many very successful businesses such as eBay and Priceline.com. A few years ago, the FCC used an auction to assign spectrum rights. Separate auction markets were used to allocate the rights for each region. But recognizing the complementarity among spectrum allocation in adjacent regions, modi cations were introduced to help bidders acquire combinations of geographically adjacent rights (for a discussion of the FCC auction design see 26] ).
When there are multiple resources to allocate and there are complementarities, the possibility of allowing combinations or bundles of resources to be the basis of the bidding has been considered, which sometimes leads to computational di culties. For example, in 27] a \smart market" for auctioning take-o and landing rights was proposed. To determine the assignment of landing rights based on bids, an integer programming problem has to be solved. In the case of a double auction for nancial assets, a bundle market mechanism has been designed and implemented that allowed market participants to trade portfolios 7] . However, in nancial markets it is common to assume that the assets are divisible so that the double auction can be solved in polynomial time. In addition, based on the portfolio orders executed, imputed prices for the individual assets can be determined. Without the divisibility assumption, auction markets that accept bundle orders lead to computational problems that are not polynomial (N P {Hard) and do not provide price guidance for the individual assets. For one-sided bundle auctions of private goods, Rothkopf et al. 23] proposed a model that maximizes the revenue of such a c o m binational auction. While the general model is N P {hard to solve 3], Rothkopf et al. have identi ed some special cases where restrictions are placed on possible combinations and can therefore be solved in polynomial time.
All of the above mentioned auction mechanisms are for private goods. A market mechanism to decide on the provision of a public good has been considered by Clarke 4] and Groves 8] . They show that it is possible to generate an incentive compatible market mechanism for resource allocation among public goods but no bundling of public goods is allowed in their designs, as is desired when there is complementarity among public goods. This paper proposes a new double auction mechanism for allocating resources to public goods where complementarity exists, as in the case of creating knowledge goods. Computationally, the problem is a discrete optimization problem since a knowledge good is either created or not (partial investments yield useless results) and it involves combinations since producers can propose various combinations of knowledge components and consumers can bid on their combinations of knowledge. Therefore our market mechanism is a combinatorial (or combinational) double auction for public goods. In addition, we also address the free-rider problem associated with public goods, which i s not present i n a n y of the combinatorial auction mechanisms for private goods.
The speci c context in which w e place our double auction mechanism is an organization's internal knowledge creation process. Knowledge is often considered a public good within an organization. Once knowledge is created, it can be freely disseminated to or shared by v arious organizational units at close to zero marginal cost. Therefore, knowledge is subject to the \free-rider" problem, which i s an example of a lack o f i n c e n tive compatibility where individual organizational units may refuse to pay for the creation of knowledge even though they privately have a high value for the knowledge. The free-rider problem has typically been used as the reason for a hierarchical decision making approach. A higher echelon decides which investment projects will beselected in order to maximize the net return on investment. At the best, knowledge end users and knowledge providers are consulted to assist in deriving the net value of the knowledge projects but in their consultative role they have no economic incentives to truthfully derive and reveal valuation information. The distributed market mechanism we propose, on the contrary, actively involves the knowledge users and providers who will be economically a ected by the outcome of the investment selection process, which in turn depends on their valuation estimates.
Another aspect often ignored in resource allocation processes for knowledge is that knowledge is often interrelated and interdependent. For example, a pharmaceutical company often has multiple research projects. Results from one project (e.g., investigating the e ects of certain chemical substances), only when combined with the results from another (e.g., the successful synthesis of a group of chemical compounds), can potentially result in a new drug treatment (i.e., there is complementarity between the two research projects). When allocating the R&D budget, allowing the two projects to be supported at the same time (as a bundle) will deliver more value than funding one of the projects alone. The complementarity aspect of knowledge calls for a resource allocation mechanism that allows explicitly the bundling of knowledge components. We do not address the problem of how k n o wledge or private information itself can be marketed, once it has already been created. Although this is a very intriguing problem (How does one prove h e h a s v aluable knowledge without giving the knowledge away?), our method only decides which investments in knowledge and knowledge projects should be pursued a priori. Once the knowledge has been created, we assume it is being shared with and accessible to the corporate entities that contributed in nancing the investments.
We rst formulate the market for trading knowledge bundles as an optimization problem where we maximize the net surplus subject to resource constraints that re ect the public goods property of knowledge. Next we s h o w that a Groves-Clark type mechanism 19] can be introduced, in which truth telling of their preference is a dominant strategy for market participants. We investigate a market model where there is only one unique provider for each knowledge component (i.e., there is no perfect substitute). Under this assumption, the market optimization model is readily computable. The mechanism is a decentralized process where agents submit their customized knowledge bundle compositions and their truthful valuations of the bundles that they want provided or are able to create. Using the model, it can be determined what knowledge components should be produced. Although the organization may have to beara de cit as a result of centralized monetary transfer to agents computed by the mechanism (as in a Groves-Clarke mechanism), it leads to e cient k n o wledge production and consumption.
The signi cance of the research is in showing that in an important case, a bundle market with discrete commodities can be successfully introduced. Although McAfee 17] pointed out that allowing bundle bidding in the FCC auction would have been more desirable, it would lead to an unsolvable problem because of the number of alternatives and the di culty of solving the resulting market clearing problem. This paper presents a case where the model can beformulated as the dual of a network ow problem 1] and be solved e ciently. It is important to recognize that as new market structures are proposed, it may require an understanding of discrete optimization methods to determine whether the proposed market is practical. To the bestof our knowledge, this is the rst paper that provides a computationally tractable solution to operating a market of bundled public goods, be it within an organization or a whole economy. It can be easily reduced to the Groves-Clark Mechanism as a special case. Like t h e Groves-Clarke mechanism, it is incentive compatible for individual agents. It is the rst model in which truth telling is a dominant strategy in a public good case that allows bundles of public goods, in this case knowledge, to betraded. As noted earlier, research results from mechanism design have already seen its contribution in the economy. However, with today's rapid development of electronic commerce on the Internet, its dynamic nature calls for not only design of mechanisms but also its real-time e cient computability. Our model, together with a computationally manageable solution, is an attempt to address such a problem.
Problem Formulation
Our imaginary corporation Batco ventures to produce a new type of batteries for use in electrical cars. Its R&D departments have identi ed 7 promising research projects: four of them can be viewed as basic research (e.g., a study of the electrical properties of certain chemical substances) the remaining three are of a more applied nature and would use the results of the basic research (e.g., how to produce these substances e ciently such that they have the electrical properties as described in the results of the basic research). Descriptions of these research projects (the subject of the research, methodology used, results to be expected, people involved, etc.) are readily available to everyone for perusal. However, the knowledge users are interested in having combinations of the projects undertaken, since individual projects by themselves are a lot less valuable (knowing the electrical properties without knowing how to produce them is not worth much to Batco). So, the value is derived from the knowledge bundles rather than from the individual knowledge components. Thus, the corporate entities determine which k n o wledge components will make up their bundle of interest together with its valuation. In our example, 12 bundles have beencomposed with the 7 knowledge components. Those knowledge bundles in turn can be categorized into three classes: the rst class (bundles 1{3) are pure knowledge provider bundles, the second class (bundles 4{6) are mixed bundles that provide some knowledge components (the applied research) if they are supplied with the necessary \knowledge input" components from the rst class, and the last class (bundles 7{12) contains only pure knowledge consumption bundles, e.g., bundles from the sales department that will be selling the new type of car batteries: they submit an estimate of what it is worth in the marketplace to have the successful design, production and marketing of electrical cars and batteries. The data about the bundle compositions is given in Table 1 The \Valuation" column gives the value derived from the bundle. For the provider bundles 1{6, there is a cost associated with making the bundle available, hence the negative v aluation numbers.
The information ow between the knowledge bundles is given in Figure 1 . Each node is a knowledge bundle. The numbers under the nodes correspond to the monetary ows generated by consuming the knowledge bundle when positive or the cost of providing the bundle when negative. The numbersto the right of each node are the labels of the knowledge components provided or consumed by the knowledge bundle. Figure 1 is not a representation of a network ow problem, as the ow is not additive and there is no ow preservation at the nodes. The resource allocation questions that should be addressed include: Which knowledge components should be created? Which k n o wledge bundles provide the highest net return on investment? How can we make sure that the stated valuations are trustworthy and accurate? What value can we assign to (a subset of) the knowledge components? If an agent is requesting a knowledge bundle, how much should she pay? And how much should an agent receive for creating a knowledge bundle?
The Knowledge Bundle Market
In this section, we give the mathematical framework to model an incentive-compatible bundle market mechanism for knowledge that intends to answer the above questions.
Mathematical Model
Let us suppose that a set of m knowledge components | R & D projects, knowledge repository technologies, knowledge processing techniques, etc. | has beenidenti ed and de ned. The question is which subset of to choose to maximize the organizational value of the investment i n knowledge, taking into account that value is derived from certain combinations of the knowledge components. We assume that we have knowledge providers as well as knowledge consumers in the organization, who may both wish that knowledge will beprovided and/or consumed in bundles. The knowledge providers may wish to provide a bundle of knowledge components, rather than individual components, because, for example, some of the components are a by-product when generating the other knowledge component(s). We explicitly look at the complementarity b e t ween knowledge objects both for providers and for consumers. Denote by K S (j) t h e set of knowledge components that are supplied, and K C (j) the set of knowledge components consumed, by bundle j. In addition, the agent speci es a maximum monetary value v j that she is willing to pay when her bundle j is provided. A knowledge provider indicates a minimum amount jv j j that she requests for making bundle j available. In other words, the agent who submitted bundle j is willing to provide the set of knowledge components K S (j) when the knowledge component set K C (j) i s a vailable and she is willing to pay an amount not to exceed v j (when v j < 0 she actually requests money). The triple <K S (j) K C (j) v j > is called a bundle order. When K S (j) = , bundle j is a pure knowledge consumer bundle for which we expect v j > 0 (she is willing to pay v j to obtain knowledge bundle j), and when K C (j) = , bundle j is a pure knowledge provider bundle for which w e expect v j < 0 (she requests ;v j for making j available). The valuation v j is the sole agent's value derived from the bundle it does not re ect any externality or any additional value derived by other corporate entities. By assuming that there are no externalities, the total value of the knowledge components for the organization is the sum of the valuations for the di erent corporate entities. In addition, if an agent submits more than one trade bundle, her total value and/or cost is assumed to be additive.
We introduce a market (more precisely a sealed bid double auction) where these knowledge bundles will betraded. As mentioned before, we assume that, if it is decided that a knowledge component will be provided, it will be available to anyone within the organization, and thus will beavailable for inclusion in any bundle that incorporates it. So, once a knowledge component is provided, it becomes a public good within the organization available for inclusion in any bundle without extra cost. The market will be run as a sealed bid double auction market: the knowledge users (or knowledge providers) submit bundle orders <K S (j) K C (j) v j > consisting of knowledge components that they are willing to provide (or want to be created or made available), together with their reservation value for providing (or acquiring) the knowledge. Bundle valuations and bundle composition of the agents will not be revealed to the other market participants. The market maker will then nd the knowledge bundles that will be provided within the organization so as to maximize the value of the market surplus, i.e., the di erence between what the participants are willing to pay to acquire knowledge bundles and the fee (or cost) charged by the knowledge providers for creating the knowledge components, or making them available. This market maker can be a fully automated electronic exchange, or it may be an impartial human market maker.
Assume that j j= m and that n trade bundles have been submitted to the market by the market participants (i.e., all corporate entities that will be a ected by the outcome of the investment process). Mathematically, the model looks as follows:
( 1 if bundle j is cleared in the market 0 if bundle j will not be used and v j is the monetary reservation value (the maximum amount a n a g e n t is willing to pay) for bundle j. The model formulation that maximizes the market surplus over the cleared trade bundles is: Model (MP) (the \Market Problem") maximizes , the net surplus of the investment i n k n o wledge, thus decides which k n o wledge components will be provided, by selecting the value-maximizing bundles in the market. The amount can also be viewed from a market viewpoint as the market surplus that results from \trading" knowledge components in bundles. The constraints assure that if a knowledge bundle j requires knowledge component i, and j is chosen, we have ij = 1 and x j = 1 so maxf ij x j : : : g = 1, and the constraint forces us to choose at least one provider bundle k (i.e., ik = ;1) for this knowledge component. Note that once i is made available, adding another bundle j 0 that consumes i does not have a n y e ect|as we w ould expect for a public good|because the constraint i n volves max j=1 ::: n f ij x j g, which s t a ys +1 as soon as i is needed in any consumer bundle j. Likewise, adding a supplemental bundle j 0 when component i Is already provided by bundle j leaves min j=1 ::: n f ij x j g unchanged and equal to -1. So, in contrast to modeling private goods where the constraints are additive because of the excludability, our constraints involve non-linearities (min and max functions) because of the public good nature of knowledge.
The investment in knowledge will partially be made through side payments from knowledge consumers to knowledge providers. However, this is not a straight-forward matter, as model (MP) is not a linear or continuous model. The traditional economic method of setting prices equal to the Lagrangean multipliers of the corresponding supply-demand constraints is therefore not applicable in our case. The question of how the participants should contribute to the investment in knowledge will require another solution.
It is important to note that if there is no monetary contribution at all by the participants, and all investments are paid for directly by t h e c e n tral authority o f the organization to the knowledge providers (e.g., in the form of extra budgets) rather than by the nal consumers of knowledge, there is lack o f i n c e n tive for the participants to provide any trustworthy v alues for v j . A knowledge consumer would set her valuation high enough so as to make sure the desired knowledge would be provided (v j ! 1 will guarantee that the bundle will be provided, without any monetary consequences) resulting in an organizational misallocation of investment funds, whereas a knowledge provider can set v j ! ; 1 so as to assure that she does not have t o p r o vide the knowledge bundle.
Internal Markets with Monetary Transfers
We argued that without monetary transfers, there is no incentive to derive an accurate estimate of the value of a knowledge bundle. Still, the monetary contributions should becalculated such that no participant has any incentive to lie about her true valuation and in uence the results of the bundles chosen for investment. 2 If we were to charge the divisions an amount equal to their reported valuation, then knowledge consumers, for example, have an incentive t o understate their valuation, whereas knowledge providers may overstate the cost of providing the knowledge bundles. The monetary contributions we propose are incentive compatible: revealing the true valuation is a dominant strategy for the market participants and thus the data fed into problem (MP) is trustworthy and will yield the optimal selection of investment bundles from the organization's perspective. Next, we describe how the incentive-compatible monetary contributions are calculated.
Let be the optimal value of the market problem (MP), and x the optimal solution of (MP). We call the bundles j for which x j = 1 active bundles. Intuitively, w e will compute by h o w m uch the valuation of a bundle could have beenchanged, and still be selected as an active bundle. Call It is not necessary to behave unethically for what we mean by \lying." Valuation information, especially for knowledge, is hard to estimate and may t a k e a lot of e ort. By not providing the economic incentive an agent m a y not devote the time and e ort necessary for accurately estimating knowledge valuation. This behavior will have t h e same e ect as genuine \lying." x j 2 f 0 1g for all j = 1 : : : n We observe that the optimal solution satis es `( v) 0, and later it will be demonstrated that setting the monetary contributions from the participants equal to v`; `( v) yields our desired incentive compatibility. Since `( v) 0, it means that knowledge consumers generally end up paying less than their valuation, knowledge providers get more than their actual cost.
In order to prove w h y these monetary contributions yield incentive compatibility, w e also need to de ne the next optimization problem. For a non-active bundle, an agent may beinterested in knowing how much her maximum valuation could befor the non-active bundle`to remain nonactive. We can use model (MP)`to answer this question by setting ` 0, and we are interested 
Proof
We assume that the market mechanism is known to all participants, but that the actual trade bundles (the triples <K S (j) K C (j) v j > of other agents) are not revealed. 3 Let v`be the agent's true valuation of bundle`, and let be the amount b y which a n a g e n t tries to change her valuation so as to obtain a better outcome, i.e., either acquire (provide) a knowledge bundle for less (more) money, or in uence the outcome so as to acquire (provide) the knowledge bundle of her desire. Let `( ) be the expected monetary gain for the agent who submitted bundle`, obtained by misrepresenting her valuation of bundle`by a n a m o u n t and thus she is considering the submission of trade bundle <K S (j) K C (j) v j + >. We will show that the dominant strategy is = 0 .
In the absence of perfect information, the agent is uncertain whether bundle`would clear or not. This would depend on the other bundles and their valuations submitted to the market. Denote an arbitrary valuation for a bundle submitted by others by the Greek symbol j and the arbitary bundle compositions by K S (j) a n d K C (j). So, a set of arbitrary trade bundles submitted to the market can be written as <K S (j) K C (j) j > (as opposed to the actual bundles submitted <K S (j) K C (j) v j + > ). For any arbitrary set of trade bundles and arbitrary valuations j the numbers `( ) and `( ) exist and even though the agent may not know their exact value, they will always satisfy `( ) 0 and `( ) 0. Let the probability of clearing bundle`bep`( ) (since the agent knows the market mechanism, we assume that she acts rationally and thus knows that p`( ) is non-decreasing). We need to analyze the gain both in case`would turn out to be an active bundle, as well as in case`would turn out to be non-active. We denote by N À ( ) the gain by misrepresentation given that bundle`would not have beenanactive bundle when = 0 , and À ( ) the gain in case`would have been an active bundle when = 0 .
If the outcome for the matching process would be x `= 0 in the base case ( = 0 no misrepresentation), then it is easy to see that
`( ), then bundle`would be cleared, but for a payment o f v`; `( ) > v, which is j `( )j higher than the agent's valuation and for > `( ), bundle`would remain non-active. 3 An agent m a y h a ve some belief about the other trade bundles but this will not change our result.
If the outcome for the matching process without misrepresentation would yield x `= 1 , t h e n À ( ) = 
Only the case in which t h e a g e n t has perfect information has to becovered. Since now the agent knows the actual valuations v j with certainty, she is able to determine the correct values for `( v) and `( v). From the de nitions of N À and À in the previous proof it can be seen that misrepresenting the valuation of bundle`has no e ect when ` `. However, since we assume perfectinformation, the event whether bundle`will becleared or not is no longer probabilistic, since it is known when all other valuations v j and composition of knowledge bundles K S (j) and K C (j) a r e k n o wn. In that case, the optimal strategy will have `( ) = 0 8 . Again nothing can be gained by misrepresentation.
Q.E.D.
The monetary transfers for the active bundles are v j ; j . These monetary transfers will not necessarily yield a balanced solution, i.e., it is not necessarily the case that P j (v j ; j )x j = 0. In most cases, P j (v j ; j )x j < 0, which means that there is a de cit. The organization would subsidize this de cit as it represents the organization's direct investment in knowledge.
The remainder of the investment in knowledge is \self-nancing," as the knowledge providers get partially compensated by the knowledge consumers. In some cases, it is also possible that P j (v j ; j )x j > 0, which means that the knowledge providing function in the organization has become a pro t center.
The Unique Providers Model
The models described above can be used to compute an optimal investment allocation in knowledge. However, in order to be practical, solution of models (MP) and (RP)`should be computationally feasible also. The next result at rst sight sheds a pessimistic light on this issue.
Proposition 3 Models (MP) and (RP)`in general form are N P {hard.
Proof
The proof reduces a known N P {hard problem (a set covering problem) to an instance of (MP).
The details are presented in the Appendix.
However, there are very interesting cases where solution of the double auction model (MP) as well as the monetary transfers by (RP)`are computationally feasible. The special case we consider is the Unique Providers (UP) model. In the Unique Providers model, we assume that 8i :j f j j ij = ;1g j = 1 . This means that there is exactly one provider (bundle) for each knowledge component i, or otherwise stated, that the knowledge objects from di erent providers are unique or identi able (thus not perfectly substitutable). This restriction does not seem very severe and will | in many practical situations | be satis ed.
For the (UP) model, we can reformulate model (MP) as a linear continuous model with a constraint matrix that is totally unimodular, yielding naturally integer solutions and the e cient solution of problems (MP) and (RP)`thus becomes possible. The (UP) model is not only easy to solve, the model turns out to be the dual of a minimum cost network ow problem which allows us to characterize dual solutions and hence | by primal-dual correspondences | properties of the primal solution vectors also. These results can beobtained from standard textbooks: for a characterization of the solutions of a minimum cost network, the reader is referred to 1], for primal-dual correspondences the reader may consult 28].
Proposition 4 In the Unique Providers model, problem (MP) can be solved as the dual of a network model (MPNET).

Proof
See appendix.
Network ow problems possesses two properties that are important in our setting 1]:
1. the dual of a network problem|which is the problem we labeled (MP)| is integer, even when the constraints x j 2 f 0 1g are relaxed to 0 x j 1 and 2. the computation of an optimal solution to a network ow problem is extremely fast, allowing large problems to be solved without di culty.
In order to formulate the dual of problem (MP), we need to de ne the following sets:
In words, the set J C (j) c o n tains the bundles that directly consume knowledge components provided by bundle j, the set J S (j) contains all bundles that supply knowledge components to bundle j.
Then, the dual of (MP) for the Unique Providers model is a network which w e call (MPNET) and is formulated as: u kj + j v j for all j = 1 : : : n with u kj u jk 0 a n d j 0. This dual problem has an economic interpretation. There is a constraint for each bundle j and there are \ ow" variables u jk between bundles j and k. In a dual problem, the variables correspond to shadow prices, or monetary ows. The quantity u kj is the income bundle j received from bundle k, as payment for the knowledge components bundle k consumes and j provides (k 2 K C (j)) u jk is the payment from bundle j to the bundles k 2 J S (j) that provide knowledge components to j.
For a pure consumer bundle j, this constraint attempts to nd feasible monetary out ows to the knowledge supplying bundles, while minimizing the excess funds j , i.e., the funds not allocated to bundles providing knowledge to j. For a pure provider bundle j, it states that the excess funds j , i.e., the di erence between the sum of all monetary ows coming from the consumer bundles and the cost ;v j required to nance bundle j should be minimized. This can beinterpreted as a measure of \economic e ciency" for the bundles provided.
For our purposes, we will view (MPNET) as a minimum cost network ow problem. However, it can be transformed into an even simpler max ow problem if one wishes to do so. The solution to the problem (MP) can be used to solve every problem (RP)`as well. We will see that the solution to (RP)`also yields valuations on certain subsets of knowledge components that will be provided, i.e., it nds clusters of \knowledge sharing entities": an isolated collection of agents that exchange a subset of knowledge components and monetary transfers only among themselves. The next section rst describes how the computation of the incentive-compatible monetary transfers is performed, then interprets the results to reveal the networks of those knowledge-sharing clusters in the organization.
Monetary Transfers in the (UP) Model
We pointed out earlier that solving model (RP)`essentially amounts to performing a \sensitivity analysis" of model (MP). Problems (RP)`and (VP)`answer questions about the ranges in which a n objective function coe cient c a n v ary such that the optimal solution of (MP) remains unchanged. This is usually done by reverting to the dual problem 28], which in our case is problem (MPNET). Without going into technical detail, it can be shown that the optimal solution to (MPNET) is not unique, which causes the results of an linear programming (LP) sensitivity analysis using a standard textbook approach to be incorrect. 4 One approach w ould be to enumerate the set of all 4 Our dual problem (MPNET) is the dual to the linearization of (MP) for the unique providers model. There is no 1-to-1 mapping from the constraints of this linearized (MP) model to the knowledge components (see model (MPLIN) dual solutions to the LP representation of (MP), but it is easier to revert to solving problem (RP)d irectly, for every active bundle`. In order to solve (RP)`, we need to introduce the following ancillary problem, which turns out to beas simple as the dual of the market problem (MPNET) itself. In the remainder, we will use the notation J as the set that contains all active bundles: Solving (RPNET)`amounts to solving the dual of (RP)`in the unique providers case. The objective function maximizes the surplus that can be apportioned to bundle`. The rst constraint guarantees that the total market surplus is equal to the market surplus from the original problem (MP). The second constraint set guarantees that the dual constraints that were binding in (MP) are still binding, and hence the primal solution remains invariant s o t h a t w e are guaranteed thatx`= x . Q.E.D.
In order to get net surpluses for subsets of knowledge components, we remind the reader that an optimal extreme point solution to a network ow problem is represented by an LP basis that corresponds to a spanning tree in the underlying graph 13]. When we delete the degenerate arcs (the ones with zero ow) from this spanning tree, we g e t a spanning forest: a collection of disconnected spanning trees. We will show h o w these spanning trees have an economic interpretation as clusters used in the proof of proposition 4 in the appendix), and hence it is incorrect to assume that the dual variables would give a n y information about shadowprices of knowledge components.
of agents that will exchange knowledge components for monetary transfers, and since there is no i n { o r o u t o w i n to those trees, those clusters are self-funded \islands" of knowledge creation.
Let T`(J` À) be a spanning tree obtained from solving problem (RP)`, where T`is de ned over t h e n o d e s e t J` J and has arc set A`= f(j k)g with j k 2 J`and u jk > 0 (no degenerate arcs in T`). Then the set of knowledge components that are generated within T`is K S (J`) def = j2J`KS (j). For convenience, call the set of all knowledge components that are selected as the result of solving (MP).
As before, we c a l l t h e net surplus of a set of knowledge components the di erence between what it costs to provide the bundles that generate them, and what knowledge consumers are willing to pay for using these knowledge components in the bundles. So, the net surplus of the set of all knowledge components is of course . But, is it possible to derive a value (from the organization's perspective), or a net surplus for one speci c knowledge component i? Because we assumed that value for knowledge consumers is only derived from a bundle of knowledge components, we will | in general | not beable to put a value on every knowledge component separately. However, in many cases we can put a value on di erent subsets of , that is, we can say that knowledge components 0 have a net surplus of at least ( 0 ) and at most ( 0 ), where of course ( 0 ) ( 0 )
. The di culty of coming up with one de nite number is because of the public good nature of knowledge: the knowledge component can be used in many ways, and it is not always possible to separate out the value of one subset as compared to another, when only values for their combination exist. More speci cally, ( 0 ) is the maximum net surplus one can assign to the knowledge components 0 , and ( 0 ) has apportioned the maximum surplus value from consumer bundles to the generation of the set of knowledge components 0 . Consequently, the net surplus of the remaining components that are provided ( n 0 ) is being minimized, and is thus equal to ( n 0 ). Proposition 6 Let T`(J` À) be the spanning tree obtained from solving (RPNET)`, and K S (J`) the set of knowledge components generated within T`. Then the maximum net surplus of K S (J`) is `, o r : (K S (J`)) = `.
Proof
We proceed by c o n tradiction. If `i s not the maximum net surplus, then there must exist a set of knowledge bundles not in J`whose monetary subsidy can bere-directed to a knowledge provider bundle in J`. This would mean that there exists a solution to (RPNET)`with positive o w u jk on an arc from j 6 2 J`to k 2 J`. But, since all arcs in T`have positive ow, and there is a unique path between any two nodes in a tree, there is a unique path from k to`using only arcs with positive ow. But then, we can increase the ow along the path j ; k ;`by increasing the ow on forward arcs on the path, and decreasing it on backward arcs (thus maintaining ow preservation), thereby increasing the value of `a s well. This contradicts the fact that `i s maximal. Q.E.D.
Corollary 7 For T`, the minimum net surplus for the knowledge components n K S (J`) is ( ; `) , or: ( n K S (J`)) = ( ; `) .
Since the total net surplus is a constant and `g ives the maximum contribution for J`, the result follows.
Proposition 6 and its corollary allow us to derive values or imputed prices to several subsets of knowledge components. The imputed price is the maximum amount that an organization would be willing to pay to obtain this knowledge subset from outside (e.g., through outsourcing). So, the value or imputed price of the subset of knowledge components K S (J`) is equal to the cost of providing it plus the net surplus `. By proposition 6 and corollary 7 this imputed price would attribute the maximum value to the set K S (J`) and minimize the value derived from other knowledge components, even if they use any or all of the components of K S (J`) as inputs.
Last, we compare the outcome of our market mechanism with what would be obtained by alternative methods. More precisely, the explicit treatment o f k n o wledge as a public good and the valuation of knowledge objects in bundles give rise to a novel market mechanism that has been discussed so far. The critical question is: could we achieve similar results with the traditional methods mentioned in the introduction?
As we argued before, non-market mechanisms su er from a lack o f i n c e n tives for the participants to derive reasonable estimates for the valuation of knowledge creation or use. (In fact, many group decision methods just skip the problem of creating reasonable estimates for the monetary valuations that would be brought about by i n vestment decisions under consideration, even though its monetary outcome will later very often be used as a measure of success or failure of the decision!) Since there is no systematic relationship with the valuations that would be obtained by non-market mechanisms, a systematic relationship between the outcomes of our knowledge bundle market and those methods is not possible. However, because of the unreliable nature of the valuations used in those methods, it is highly unlikely that the outcome would be close to the outcome from our proposed knowledge bundle market.
Next, assume that an internal market mechanism is used, but it does not allow bundle trading and/or does not explicitly address the public good nature (and consequently the free-rider symptom resulting from it) of knowledge investments. In case the market mechanism does not allow bundle trading, agents will have t o d e r i v e v alues w i (i = 1 : : : m ) for the separate knowledge components, b u t i n c a s e of complementarities (either for knowledge providers or consumers) it holds that v j > P i=1 ::: m ij w i , where v j is the true bundle valuation. So, we conclude that the reported values w i would understate the value of the bundle for the knowledge users, and overstate the cost of knowledge creation.
When the public good character of knowledge is ignored, the use of knowledge would be charged like a n y ordinary private good. Each knowledge consumer would have to pay a set price to access or use the knowledge, and the participants will need to reveal the maximum price they would bewilling to pay, knowing that they will becharged as a (increasing) function of this valuation. Then the well-known free-rider problem results: each agent has an incentive t o under-report their valuation, hoping that the others' valuations will subsidize the knowledge creation. The method of determining monetary transfers described in this paper is developed particularly to deal with this free-rider problem. To summarize, in every market mechanism where the participants cannot give v aluations over bundles, or where knowledge is treated as a private good, valuations submitted to the market tend to beunderstated. So, it su ces to compare our mechanism with a market mechanism where bids are submitted with valuations that tend to be understated. 
We will make use of the following two facts which are trivial to prove. In order to provide a unique solution in the exceptional situation in which there exist alternative optima for problem (MP), we assume that the solution of (MP) is the one that yields the set of active bundles J of highest cardinality 5 . Let J and J 0 be the set of active bundles for the optimization problems (MP) with objective function coe cients v j and v 0 j yielding an objective function value and 0 respectively. We will prove that J 0 n J = , a n d t h us j 2 J 0 ) j 2 J (so J 0 J ) b y using contradiction. So, for now suppose that J 0 n J 6 = . The fact that J J 0 is a feasible solution when J and J 0 are feasible solutions guarantees the uniqueness and existence of such set.
contradict the fact that J is the largest set of active bundles that yields . This situation would only occur when (MP) has a non-unique solution, hence we had to assume that J was the unique solution to (MP) since it was the highest-cardinality s e t . Q.E.D. Another consequence which easily follows from our analysis is that larger organizations have an economies of scale advantage when it comes to knowledge creation. This again follows from the public good nature of knowledge within a rm. When some knowledge components are used by more corporate entities and included in more knowledge bundles, it will becomemore likely that the creation of them can be subsidized.
Solution to Batco's knowledge investment problem
We return to the knowledge investment problem of Batco, described in the beginning. Solving model (MP) yields as active bundles: J = f1 2 3 5 6 7 10 11 12g (only 4, 8 and 9 are non-active), and thus knowledge components 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 are provided (only knowledge component 5 is not), for a net surplus of = 3. Solution of the re-distribution problems (RP)`yields 1 = 3 = 6 = 7 = 11 = 12 = 3 and 2 = 5 = 10 = 1 . This is given in Table 2 , together with the monetary transfers for the active bundles.
The market de cit for Batco is 18 monetary units, which w ould be provided by the organization as its share in the investment in knowledge. So, the organization provides an \investment" of 18 u n i t s i n t h e k n o wledge creation function, and will realize a net pro t of 3 from this investment. If the organization is constrained for capital, it may decide to raise this amount from the nancial capital markets, with an expected net return of over 16%. Note that the total amount invested is 66, but that 48 of that amount is generated by \self-nancing," i.e., it will be nanced by the corporate entities that derive v alue from the knowledge to be provided. Of course, there will be no monetary transfers for the non-active bundles. Next, we show h o w to construct the \knowledge sharing clusters" for Batco and derive imputed prices for knowledge component subsets. From proposition 6, these would berevealed by solving models (RP)`. For`2 f1 3 6 7 11 12g, the tree T`spans all nodes of active bundles, so here J`= J (this situation is not displayed). However, for`2 f 2 5 10g, the spanning forest separates into two spanning trees, displayed in Figure 2 : one tree contains the nodes f1 3 6 7 11 12g, and the other contains nodes f2 5 10g. Bundles f2 5 10g together provide the knowledge components 2 and 6, and the maximum net surplus for those components is 1 unit (and hence the minimum contribution of components f1 3 4 7g is 2 by corollary 7). This can be explained by the fact that the three bundles (2, 5 and 10) also make use of the \public good," components 1,3 and 7, but { \free-riding" on those { create the additional components 2 and 6, which are only used by the participants who submitted bundles 2, 5 and 10. However, the additional value from knowledge components 2 and 6 cannot exceed one unit (in this case all payments from bundle 10 go to bundles 2 and 5, no monetary ow leaves the cluster f2 5 10g), and thus the minimum value for the components 1, 3, 4 and 7 is 2 units, which is the surplus generated by the consumer bundles 7, 11 and 12 which solely use components f1 3 4 7g . The trees T`also give a representation of which groups would be involved in exchanging information (e.g., components 2 and 6 would only beexchanged between the divisions that submitted bundles 2, 5 and 10) and how the creation would be internally subsidized by the di erent divisions. The dashed lines in Figure 2 indicate how the creation of the non-active bundles would be subsidized. As is clear from the gure, the creation of component 5 would generate an additional de cit of 3 units. The valuation problem (VP)`from section 3.2 could be used to investigate how the cost of providing or the value for the use of knowledge component 6 needs to change in order to be selected among the investment-maximizing knowledge components. If we w ere to solve problems (VP), we get 4 = 8 = 9 = ;3, so investment in knowledge component 5 would result in a net loss of 3 with the present knowledge valuations. Or, in other words, the creation of knowledge component 5 (o ered by bundle 4) should become at least 3 units cheaper, or the combined value of component 5 in the bundles 8 and 9 should increase by at least three units before it would be pro table to produce it.
Conclusion
We have presented a model that optimally selects what knowledge should be invested in or made available. We argue that a centralized approach may lack the oversight and local information needed to obtain an optimal selection. Moreover, without economic incentives, corporate entities may n o t h a ve the motivation to provide the true valuation for the use of knowledge. Therefore, we derived an incentive-compatible market mechanism where corporate entities can trade knowledge in bundles. The bundle aspect allows for the complementary nature of the knowledge components.
We analyzed this market mechanism in a situation where no knowledge component could be substituted by another or a set of other components. In this case, the Unique Providers assumption means that a knowledge component is identi able and unique depending on the creator/provider. Then, the problem of selecting the value-maximizing bundles reduced to the dual of network problem, and monetary transfers were convenient to calculate as well. In addition, the procedure identi ed \knowledge sharing clusters" which p r o vide insight i n h o w certain sets of knowledge will be created and used and by whom they will be paid, and it give s a l o wer and upper bound on the value of this set of knowledge from an organizational perspective. Finally, w e s h o we d t h a t a m a r k et mechanism where agents tend to understate their knowledge valuations yields an underinvestment in knowledge.
We modeled the investment decision in knowledge using binary variables: partial investments in knowledge projects are not useful. Hence, a mathematical analysis that assumes continuous functions that derives optimality criteria based on rst order conditions and Lagrangean multipliers is not applicable due to the discrete thus non-di erentiable nature of the problem we are addressing. Our analysis uses discrete mathematical tools (graph theory and network ow theory) to obtain optimality conditions and characterizations of the optimal solution of the knowledge investment problem. These tools have the added advantage of being computationally very e cient so that the practical implementation of the market mechanism is possible even for very large problem instances.
Future research will investigate how this market will impact the behavior of individual agents a n d t h e i r v aluation of knowledge. In addition, we will analyze cases other than the Unique Providers situation, i.e., in case some knowledge components could be substituted by (a set of) others. Overall, we feel that the proposed methodology will shed new light on distributed decision making for knowledge investment within an organization.
Proof of Proposition 4
First, we need the following de nitions. We recall that K S (j) = fi j ij = ;1g K C (j) = fi j ij = + 1 g and K S (j) and K C (j) w ere the sets that identi ed which k n o wledge components were provided resp. consumed by bundle j. But, we a l s o n e e d t h e i n verse mappings, i.e., for a knowledge component i, we need to know which bundles provide i and which bundles consume i. So, we de ne: S (i) j= 1 for all i. So, every constraint in (MPLIN) contains exactly one +1 and one ;1 coee cient, and thus it is the dual of a network problem for which i n tegrality in both the primal and the dual is automatically obtained when relaxing the constraints x j 2 f 0 1g to 0 x j 1.
